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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j) (2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that Plaintiffs' state law defamation and 
false arrest claims are not barred by Utah's one-year statute of limitations, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-29(4)? This issue was preserved in the trial court in the Defendants' 
memoranda on summary judgment at R. 2971-73, 3123-24, 3187-88, and 3227-29. 
Standard of review: The Utah Supreme Court reviews a district court's 
conclusions of law and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party. Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, f^ 10, 235 P.3d 
730. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose from the issuance of a citation to Plaintiff Jeff Howe by Salt Lake 
City Police Sgt. James Bryant on July 21, 2003, and Mr. Howe's subsequent acquittal on 
directed verdict. Mr. Howe, his father Jerry, and their company, Peak Alarm 
(collectively referred to herein as "Plaintiffs") filed a notice of claim on June 25, 2004. 
Plaintiffs brought suit against Sgt. Bryant and Shanna Werner (Salt Lake City's Alarm 
Coordinator) on April 7, 2005 in their individual capacities, alleging (among several 
other causes of action) Utah law claims of false arrest/imprisonment against Sgt. Bryant, 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and defamation against Ms. Werner1. Bryant and Werner moved for summary judgment, 
which was denied by the trial court as to these two claims. R. 3236-38. The trial court's 
decision was certified as a final order for purposes of appeal (R. 3264-66), and 
Defendants appealed. R. 3267-87. This Court, in an Order dated February 29, 2012, 
determined that the certification of the trial court's ruling as final was in error, but elected 
to consider the appeal as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order, and 
granted the petition. R. 3387. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 21, 2003, Defendant/Appellant Salt Lake City Police Sgt. James 
Bryant and a fellow officer met with Jeff Howe at Peak Alarm's place of business to 
issue him a citation for violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105. R. 1723, 1745, 1768, 
3237. 
2. Jeff Howe admits that Sgt. Bryant gave him the option of being arrested or 
signing the citation, and that he opted to sign the citation in lieu of arrest. R. 1770. 
3. Jeff Howe admits he was not handcuffed at any time, he was not physically 
restrained by Sgt. Bryant, nor did Sgt. Bryant lay hands on him in any way. R. 1771, 
1826. 
1
 Most of the original causes of action pled in this matter have been dismissed on 
summary judgment and appeal. However, because the only claims relevant to this 
appeal are the state law false arrest and defamation causes of action, the other 
claims, and the proceedings related to those claims, are not addressed herein for the 
sake of simplicity. 
2 
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4. The officers then left the building, and Howe was subjected to no further 
restrictions on his liberty other than to appear in court at some time in the future. R. 
1820-22. 
5. Jeff Howe was tried in Justice Court on April 12, 2004, and won a directed 
verdict in his favor. R. 1838-43. 
6. On June 25, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim with the City Recorder's 
Office, alleging unlawful conduct by the City and one or more of its employees. R. 1845-
52. 
I. On April 7, 2005, plaintiffs filed their Complaint against the City and the 
individual defendants in their individual and official capacities. R. 1-21. 
8. Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. Werner made broad and damaging statements 
regarding the alarm industry that were published as late as April 30, 2003. R. 112-15. 
9. Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. Werner also targeted Peak Alarm specifically in a 
letter to a Peak Alarm customer dated March 21, 2002 wherein she encouraged the 
customer to "consider selecting another company who will do a better job for you." R. 
115. 
10. Plaintiffs allege that these statements unfairly maligned Peak Alarm, Jerry and 
Jeff Howe, threatened existing and future business prospects of Peak Alarm, and sent a 
"chill over the expression of legitimate viewpoints." R. 115. 
II. Jeff Howe concedes that he knew about all of these allegedly defamatory 
statements in 2003. R. 1775-1817, 1802, 1805, 1812-13, 1818-19. 
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12. Both parties to this action moved for summary judgment. On August 5, 2008, 
the trial court heard oral arguments on the parties' summary judgment motions, and took 
the matter under advisement. R. 2661. 
13. On October 6, 2008, the trial court issued a Ruling granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, and denying Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment. R. 2661-96. 
14. Plaintiffs appealed the Ruling to this Court, which affirmed in part, and 
reversed in part. The Court remanded seven Utah law claims and one federal law claim 
back to the trial court. R. 2753-88. 
15. Defendants again moved for summary judgment on February 4,2011. R. 
2877-79, 2882-2928, 2953-96. 
16. The trial court ultimately denied summary judgment as to the state law false 
arrest/seizure and defamation claims on December 7, 2011. R. 3235-47. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) provides that an action for defamation and false 
arrest must be brought within one year. Jeff Howe alleges he was falsely arrested on July 
21, 2003. Therefore, he must have filed his Complaint by July 21, 2004. Because he did 
not file his Complaint until April 7, 2005, almost nine months too late, his false arrest 
claim must be dismissed. 
Mr. Howe also alleges that he was defamed by comments made by Shanna Werner 
that were published as late as April 30, 2003. All of the allegedly defamatory comments 
were either known by Plaintiffs, or were reasonably discoverable, by July of 2003. 
4 
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Therefore, at the latest, Plaintiffs' Complaint must have been filed by July of 2004 to be 
timely. Again, because the Complaint was not filed until April of 2005, Plaintiffs' 
defamation cause of action must also be dismissed as untimely. 
Plaintiffs allege that because they complied with the procedural requirements of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq., ("the Immunity 
Act"), they were not required to also comply with the one-year statute of limitation for 
defamation and false arrest claims. Apparently, the trial court agreed, although it is not 
entirely clear from the trial court's Ruling whether it actually considered the Complaint's 
timeliness pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4). 
In practical terms, the trial court's Ruling effectively rendered Utah's one-year 
statute of limitation for these claims meaningless and without effect. The trial court 
should have interpreted both the Immunity Act and the statute of limitation in manner 
which gave both statutes full effect, absent an express intent to the contrary by the Utah 
Legislature. It is clear that the Legislature intended to limit a party's ability to bring suit 
for defamation and false arrest claims to one year. Nothing in the Immunity Act provides 
that its procedural requirements supplant or supersede any limitation period in other 
sections of the Utah Code. If that was what the Legislature intended, they certainly knew 
how to do so. 
The Immunity Act provides that where immunity from suit is waived, consent to 
be sued is granted, and liability of an entity, or its employee, shall be determined as if the 
entity (or employee) is a private person. It also provides that none of its provisions may ^ 
adversely affect any immunity from suit that an entity or employee may otherwise assert 
5 
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under state or federal law. Here, Sgt. Bryant and Ms. Werner were immune from suit by 
virtue of Utah's one-year statute of limitation, which barred Plaintiffs' untimely 
Complaint. 
The Immunity Act only extends to the grant or waiver of governmental immunity. 
It does not, in and of itself, provide a basis for liability or any cause of action. Its notice 
of claim requirements are nothing more than a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, merely 
providing a deadline for giving notice of a claim against a governmental entity. It does 
not prohibit the Legislature from imposing a shorter statutory filing date for any specific 
cause of action, as it clearly did here. 
At least two Utah Court of Appeals cases have required that a plaintiff comply 
with both the procedural requirements of the Immunity Act, as well as any other statute 
of limitation that may apply. The most directly on point is Cline v. State, 2005 UT App 
498, 142 P.3d 127 (cert, denied April 21, 2006), which held that Mr. Cline's libel and 
slander claims were barred by the same limitation statute at issue here, even though he 
otherwise complied with the requirements of the Immunity Act. 
In Carter v. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, 2000 UT App 21, 996 P.2d 1076, 
the Court held that Mr. Carter's compliance with the Immunity Act did not excuse him 
from also complying with the limitation period provided in the Utah Malpractice Act. 
Thus, Plaintiffs here were required to comply with both the procedural 
requirements of the Immunity Act (which they did) AND the one-year statute of 
limitation for defamation and false arrest claims (which they did not). Nothing prevented 
them from doing so. 
6 
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Therefore, the trial court's Ruling denying summary judgment to Sgt. Bryant and 
Ms. Werner must be REVERSED, and Plaintiffs' defamation and false arrest claims must 
be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS'STATE LAW FALSE ARREST 
AND DEFAMATION CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY UTAH'S 
ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
Plaintiffs' state law false arrest and defamation claims are barred by Utah's one 
year statute of limitation, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (2001)2, which provides: "[a]n 
action may be brought within one year . . . for libel, slander, assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, or seduction." There is no dispute that Jeff Howe alleges he was 
"arrested" and/or "seized" on July 21, 2003. See Statement of Fact No. 1. In Utah, a 
claim for false arrest/seizure arises on the date of the claimed "arrest" or "seizure." 
Tolman v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 560 P.2d 1127, 1128 (Utah 1977). 
Therefore, Plaintiffs must have filed their action for false arrest/seizure by July 21, 2004. 
Because the Complaint in this matter was not filed until April 7, 2005, nearly nine 
months too late, Plaintiffs failed to comply with the one year statute of limitations, and 
their false arrest claim must be dismissed. 
2
 In 2003, when Plaintiffs' cause of action arose, this code provision was numbered 
as § 78-12-29(4). In 2008, the Utah Legislature renumbered this statute as § 78B- < 
2-302(4), and removed "assault" and "battery" from subsection four. Otherwise, 
the relevant language of the two statutes is identical. 
7 
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Similarly, all of the statements by Ms. Werner that have been alleged to be 
defamatory were either known by Plaintiffs, or reasonably discoverable, by July of 2003. 
Therefore, at the latest, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleging defamation must have been filed by 
July of 2004 to be timely. Because the Complaint in this matter was not filed until April 
7, 2005, Plaintiffs' defamation claim must also be dismissed. 
II. 
THE JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES OF THE 
IMMUNITY ACT DO NOT SUPERSEDE LIMITATION 
PERIODS PROVIDED IN OTHER CODE SECTIONS, 
NOR DO THEY ALTER A PERSON'S OBLIGATION 
TO COMPLY WITH THOSE LIMITATION PERIODS. 
On summary judgment below, Plaintiffs argued that because they timely filed a 
notice of claim, as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-113 ("Immunity Act"), and filed their Complaint within one year of the denial of 
their notice of claim, they were not required to comply with Utah's one-year statute of 
limitation. R. 3021-23, 3036-37. The trial court apparently agreed, ruling that Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-11(1), when read in conjunction with § 63-30-15(2), "is an indication that 
such claims may be tolled for the duration of the approval/denial period." R. 3236-37. 
Therefore, "[b]ecause Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed within one year [of the filing of 
their notice of claim], regardless of a denial or approval, the noted claims are timely 
3
 In 2004, the Utah Legislature repealed the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. (1997) and re-enacted it as the Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-101 et seq. The citations in this 
brief are to the former statute, which was in effect at the time Plaintiffs' causes of 
action arose in July of 2003. The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah is currently 
codified as Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-101 et seq. 
8 
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pursuant to the [Immunity] Act." R. 3238. However, in its Ruling, the trial court did not 
specifically address Utah's one-year statute of limitation, nor how that limitation period 
interfaces with the Immunity Act, so it is not entirely clear whether the trial even 
considered the Complaint's timeliness pursuant to the one-year limitation period provided 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4). 
Whether it intended to do so or not, the practical effect of the trial court's Ruling 
is to render the one-year statute of limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) 
meaningless and without effect. It is axiomatic that statutes should not be read in a 
manner that renders another code section meaningless unless the Legislature clearly 
expresses otherwise. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, All U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ('The 
courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when 
two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. When there 
are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible"); McCoy 
v. Severson, 118 Utah 502, 508, 222 P.2d 1058, 1061 (1950) (It is a rule of statutory 
construction that where there are two or more statutes dealing with the same subject 
matter they will be construed so as to maintain the integrity of both). 
The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the "true intent and 
purpose of the Legislature." State ex rel Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele 
County, 2002 UT 8, f 10, 44 P.3d 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). There can be 
no question that the Utah Legislature intended to limit defamation and false 
imprisonment claims to one year. An important purpose of a statute of limitation is to 
9 
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"prevent the injustice which may result from the prosecution of stale claims" due to the 
"difficulties caused by lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses." Lund 
v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah 1997). The interpretation urged by Plaintiffs would 
completely ignore the Legislature's clear intent and negate the very purpose of Utah's 
one-year statute of limitation on these claims. 
Further, the Immunity Act contains no provision stating that it takes precedence 
over, or supersedes, any other limitation contained in the Utah Code. If that was the Utah 
Legislature's intent, they certainly knew how to do so. To the contrary, the Immunity 
Act specifically provides that where the government's immunity is waived, consent to be 
sued is granted, and "liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a 
private person." There can be no dispute that private persons are subject to the one-year 
statute of limitation for libel and slander. Additionally, the Immunity Act provides that 
"[n]othing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any immunity from 
suit that a governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal 
law." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2). 
Nevertheless, it appears that both Plaintiffs and the trial court misapprehend the 
Immunity Act, the Utah decisions applying it, and how it interfaces with other statutory 
limitation periods. The scope of the Immunity Act itself "extends only to the grant and 
waiver of governmental immunity; the Act does not itself serve as the basis for liability 
or any cause of action." Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, j^ 16, 24 
P.3d 958 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(l)(c)). Similarly, the notice of claim 
requirements of the Immunity Act are nothing more than a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
10 
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suing a governmental entity or employee. Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, fflf 9-10, 
40 P.3d 632. The Immunity Act merely provides a deadline for which notice must be 
given that there is a claim against a governmental entity. It does not prohibit the 
legislature from imposing a shorter statutory filing date for a specific cause of action. 
The Immunity Act's requirements are not, in and of themselves, a separate and distinct 
limitation scheme. 
Claims that fail to comply with a statute of limitation, even if they otherwise 
comply with the Immunity Act's jurisdictional prerequisites, are still barred. Carter v. 
Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, 2000 UT App 21, 996 P.2d 1076 (in cases where both 
the Immunity Act and the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act apply, compliance with the 
procedural requirements of both is required); Cline v. State, 2005 UT App 498, 142 P.3d 
127 (cert, denied April 21, 2006) (libel and slander claims barred by the one-year statute 
of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4), even though plaintiff 
otherwise complied with the Immunity Act). The mere fact that the government has 
granted statutory rights of action against itself, and imposed certain conditions on those 
rights of action, does not mean that those conditions supplant and supersede all other 
statutory provisions related to a claim against a governmental entity. The Immunity Act 
does not provide a "separate filing scheme and deadlines" to the exclusion of all other 
statutory provisions, as urged by Plaintiffs. 
The Cline case is directly on point. There, Cline's cause of action arose no later 
than November 2002. His notice of claim was filed in April 2003 (five months later), and 
the Complaint was filed June 10, 2004 (one year and seven months after the cause of 
11 
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action accrued, and one year and roughly 60 days after the notice of claim was filed) . In 
spite of the fact that his notice of claim and Complaint were timely filed, and he 
otherwise complied with the filing requirements of the Immunity Act, the Court of 
Appeals nevertheless held that his claims were time-barred because Cline failed to 
comply with the applicable one-year statute of limitation for libel and slander. Cline, 
2005 UT App 498, % 41 (cert, denied April 21, 2006, 133 P.3d 437). 
Similarly in Carter, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit against a 
governmentally-owned hospital. While Mr. Carter complied with the "procedural 
requirements" of the Immunity Act, he did not comply with the requirements of the 
Malpractice Act. Carter, 2000 UT App at j^ 15. The Court concluded that compliance 
with the Immunity Act did not excuse Mr. Carter from also complying with the time 
limitation in the Malpractice Act. Id. Both Cline and Carter are directly applicable to 
the issues in this appeal. See also Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, 243 
P.3d 500 (applying the Utah Whistleblower Act's ("WBA") 180-day limitation period to 
action against City where plaintiff otherwise complied with Immunity Act requirements, 
4
 While Plaintiffs correctly pointed out on summary judgment (R. 3213) that the 
decision does not specifically state whether Cline's notice of claim was actually 
denied, or was deemed denied 90 days after it was filed, it makes no difference 
whatsoever in the analysis. If Cline had filed his complaint more than one year 
from the date his notice of claim was denied, the Court would have had an easy 
decision, dismissing for failure to comply with the Immunity Act's requirements. 
Instead, the Court analyzed Cline's malicious prosecution, fraud, libel and slander 
claims under the separate one-year limitation statute, something it would not have 
done if Cline's complaint was time-barred under the Immunity Act alone. 
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recognizing that plaintiffs must file a notice of claim related to a WBA cause of action 
much sooner than the one year provided for in the Immunity Act). 
Mere, under Utah law, Plaintiffs must have complied with the filing requirements 
of the Immunity Act (which they did) AND complied with the one- year statute of 
limitations for defamation and false arrest claims (which they did not). Nothing 
prevented them from doing so. However, because they failed to file their complaint 
within one year of the accrual of their causes of action, those claims are time-barred 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4). The trial court's Ruling on this issue must be 
reversed, and Plaintiffs' defamation and state law false arrest claims must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants/Appellants respectfully request that this Court REVERSE the trial 
court's Ruling denying summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' state law defamation and false 
arrest claims. 
Dated this G^° day of July, 2012. 
J. WBBLEY ROBINSON 
Senior] Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PEAK ALARM COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation; JERRY D. HOWE, an 
individual; and, MICHAEL JEFFREY 
HOWE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. • " 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah municipal corporation; SHANNA 
WERNER, an individual; CHARLES F. 
"RICK" DINSE, an individual; SCOTT 
ATKINSON, an individual, JAMES 
BRYANT, an individual; and, JOHN 
DOESI-X, individuals, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 050906433 . 
Judge: LA. DEVER 
" 
The entitled matter is before the Court following the hearing of September 21, 
2011, addressing Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Trial Date And Either Amend Ruling Or, In 
The Alternative , Enter Final Judgment As To Dismissed Claims and, Defendants' 
Memorandum in Response to Court's Directive. 
Having reviewed the noted memoranda and having heard oral arguments on the 
entitled matter, the Court CLARIFIES IN-PART and AMENDS IN-PART its Ruling of 
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August 19, 20111. 
Plaintiffs maintain that pursuant to the ruling issued by the Utah Supreme Court, 
the causes of action that remain include: (1) False Arrest/Imprisonment against 
Defendants Shanna Werner ("Werner"), Alarm Coordinator for Salt Lake City Police . 
Department and Sergeant James Bryant ("Bryant"), Salt Lake City Police Officer, (2) 
Malicious Prosecution against Werner and Bryant, (3) Fourth Amendment Violation 
against Werner and Bryant, (4) Defamation against Werner, and (5) Civil 
Conspiracy against Werner and Bryant. 
Defendants also raised a claim asserting that Plaintiffs' state claims are barred 
by the relevant statute of limitations. In regards to that issue, the language of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ("Act"), sheds light on this contentious issue. ..••'. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-11(1) states, "A claim arises when the 
statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private person begins 
to run." (2003)2. 
Reading the noted section of the Act in light with Section 63-30-15(2), which 
unambiguously provides that "ft]he claimant shall begin the action within one year after 
1The Court's August 2011 Ruling followed a remand ruling issued by the Utah Supreme Court on 
April 19, 2010, Peak Alarm Company, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2010 UT 22, 243 P.3d 1221. 
2
 The Legislature clarified that "injuries alleged to be caused by a governmental entity that 
occurred before July 1, 2004, [are to] be governed by the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act[.]" Laws 2004, c. 267, 48. 
2 
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the denial of the claim or within one year after the [ninety day] denial period specified in 
this chapter has expired;" is an indication that such claims may be tolled for the duration 
of the approval/denial period. See Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. 
Elec. Registration Svs., Inc., 2011 UTApp 232,1J12, 2011 WL 2714429 (Aug. 10, 2011) 
('To discern legislative intent, we look first to the statute's plain language. Also, when 
interpreting statutes, [w]e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and 
read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. Additionally, [w]e read 
the plain language of [a] statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with 
other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. Furthermore, if the plain 
meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools 
are needed." (citation omitted)). 
Plaintiff Michael Jeffrey Howe ("Howe") was issued the citation on July 21, 2003, 
and later arraigned3, and pled not guilty on July 30, 2003. See also Utah Code Ann. § 
77-2-2(3) (2003) ("'Commencement of prosecution means the filing of an information or 
an indictment.") Howe's trial was held on April 12, 2004, at which time the Honorable 
Paul F. Iwasaki concluded that (1) the City failed to produce any evidence establishing 
criminal intent; (2) the City did not meet the necessary elements to prove that Howe 
3An arraignment is defined as a "proceeding whereby a defendant is brought before a judge 
having jurisdiction to try the offense so that the defendant may be formally apprised of the charges 
pending against him or her and directed to plead to them." 21 Am Jur 2d Criminal Law § 545 (2008). 
3 
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violated 76-9-105(1); and, (3) no evidence was presented that Howe knowingly or 
intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false 
alarm as per 76-9-105(1). (Exs.. to Pis' Mot. for Part, Summ'.J, Ex. 9, 4-5). 
On June 25, 2004, Howe filed his notice of claim with Salt Lake City, with the 
Complaint being filed on April 7, 2005. Because Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed within 
one (1) year, regardless of a denial or approval, the noted claims are timely pursuant to 
the Act. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15(2). 
Addressing Plaintiffs'causes of action, the Court rules as follows. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §1983, Deprivation of Constitutional Rights 
Although Plaintiffs heavily rely on the Utah Supreme Court's ruling, they failed to 
present any evidence that Werner participated in the seizure, i.e., creating such a 
circumstance that "a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave." Peak, 2010 at fl44 (citing Michigan v. Chestemut 486 U.S. 567, 573; Reeves v. 
Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244. 1259 (10th Cir.2007))(emphasis added). \ 
While Plaintiffs claim that an issue(s) of fact pertaining to probable cause4 as to 
whether any of the of the information to proceed against Howe was provided by 
Werner, that does not remedy the scenario that played out the day of July 21, 2003, 
"Plaintiffs relied in part, on Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), for support 
of retaining the noted claim against Werner. However, the Hodges' case does not address the issue of a 
Fourth Amendment seizure. 
4 
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and whether Howe believed he was free to leave when Bryant allegedly claimed that he 
was there to arrest Howe. See Novitskv v. City Of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th 
Cir. 2007) ("A seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes whenever a police officer 
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away" (citation and quotations 
omitted)(emphasis added)). 
Plaintiffs' reliance on cases such as Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 
151 (Utah 1991), to impute liability to Werner are misplaced. In Hodges, a Gibson store 
manager, Cosgrove, initially confronted Hodges for allegedly stealing money, id at 
155! It was only after Cosgrove's initial confrontation and reliance upon Cosgrove's 
initial allegations that Gibson management pursued action against plaintiff. ]d. 
Moreover, although Gibson management discovered that Cosgrove had embezzled 
company funds, which actions were attributed to plaintiff, it failed to inform the 
prosecuting attorney of the recently discovered facts until the eve of plaintiff's trial, jd. 
Plaintiff sued both Cosgrove and Gibson, for malicious prosecution and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
The court, in its analysis, determined that the theory of vicarious liability was 
applicable to Gibson. Id. at 156-157. The Hodges court explained: 
The law established in Birknerv. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1989) [citation omitted], is that an employer is vicariously liable for 
an employee's intentional tort if the employee's purpose in performing the 
acts was either wholly or only in part to further the employer's business, 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
even if the employee was misguided in that respect. . . . The rule of 
vicarious liability for intentional torts stated in Birkner also applies when a 
servant or an agent is authorized to initiate a legal action, [citing 
Restatement (Second) of Agency §253 cmt. a]. . . . 
Crosgrove and other Gibson officials. . . clearly acted within their 
delegated authority in bringing charges against Hodges; indeed, 
Crosgrove acted under express directions from corporate officials and 
also had the authority of a manager. Even if his authority as a manager 
were not sufficient to authorize him to initiate a criminal prosecution, it is 
clear that in this case he acted with the approval and under the direction 
of higher officials. 
811 P.2d at 156-57, 
Plaintiffs have failed to show any evidence that Werner had any authority to over. 
Bryant in order to impute vicarious liability to her. See (Exs.. to Pis' Mot. for Part. 
Summ. J., Ex. 15 (Werner Dep. 9:1-12, July 12, 2007)). 
In addition, the supreme court's findings of Howe's alleged violation of his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free of from unreasonable seizures, was based solely on the 
assessment of Bryant's actions and not Werner's. Peak, 2010 at Tffl 44-565. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim remains a viable cause of action 
for consideration in trial against Bryant only. 
5in concluding, the court writes of Howe's Fourth Amendment claim: 
In sum, Mr. Howe has presented facts that tend to show Sgt Bryant violated his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, a right clearly established 
at the time of Sgt. Bryant's alleged misconduct. 
Id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
6 
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2. False Arrest/Imprisonment 
The essential elements of false imprisonment are: (1) the detention or restraint of 
one against his will and (2) the unlawfulness6 of the detention or restraint. 32 Am Jur 
2d False Imprisonment § 7,(2008); Lee v. Lanqlev, 2005 UT App 339, fi19, 121 P.3d 
33, ("False imprisonment is an act intending to confine the other within boundaries fixed 
by the actor, which results in a confinement while the other is conscious of the 
confinement or is harmed by it." (citations and quotations omitted)). 
Because Plaintiffs failed to establish that Werner participated in the restraint or is 
vicariously liable for Bryant's alleged detention/restraint of Howe, this claim remains a 
viable cause of action at trial only against Bryant 
3". Malicious Prosecution 
Although the supreme court determined that Werner and Bryant are entitled to 
qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, Peak, 
2010 at ^ 57-62, Plaintiffs maintain their state law claim of malicious prosecution is still 
a viable cause of action. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs rely on the language of the supreme court. Plaintiffs first 
cite to paragraph twenty-four (24), where the court stated: 
[P]robable cause to effectuate an arrest requires that we objectively 
6ln order for a statute to render an arrest lawful, the arrest "must be effected in accordance with 
statutory dictates." Lee v. Lanqlev, 2005 UT App 339, fi13, 121 P.3d 33 (citation omitted). 
' 7 
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review the actions by police by asking whether from the facts known to 
the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly ... be drawn therefrom, a 
reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified 
in believing that the suspect had committed the offense. Therefore, we 
must determine whether the facts known to Sgt. Bryant and Ms. Werner, 
along with any fair inferences that may be derived from them, would lead 
a reasonable and prudent person in the officer's position to be justified, in-
believing that the. suspect had committed the offense. 
id. at TJ24 (citations and quotations omitted). 
This statement is drawn from the supreme court's assessment from Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment claim that Bryant and Werner acted without 
probable cause in arresting Howe. The court, however, went on to conclude: 
Mr. Howe told police dispatch that a security guard had verified the 
burglary. He knew that police would not otherwise respond. From his 
lobbying activities, Mr. Howe knew the content of the Salt Lake City 
ordinance. And Mr. Howe's own employee had been told by a police 
dispatcher, minutes earlier, that police would not respond to unverified 
burglar alarms by an alarm company. Additionally, Mr. Howe's own 
"whatever it takes" statement could be interpreted by a prudent officer as
 : 
meaning that Mr. Howe would say anything necessary to persuade police 
to respond to a mere burglary alarm regardless of whether he believed an 
actual burglary had occurred. Finally, there are inconsistencies in Mr. 
Howe's initial statements. Mr. Howe told police dispatch that there was a .. 
burglary in progress. By the time Mr. Howe was interviewed by police, he 
claimed he was reporting a "panic alarm" based on a theory that 
"someone's life could potentially be in danger." Given these facts, we 
cannot conclude as a matter of law that a prudent officer would not have 
been justified in concluding Mr. Howe reported a crime while knowing it 
was false. 
This does not mean there are no facts suggesting Sgt. Bryant and 
Ms. Werner acted without probable cause. Indeed, in Part III we discuss 
these facts thoroughly, But, given that we must view the facts in a light 
most favorable to Salt Lake City—the nonmoving party on this 
8 
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motion—we conclude the district court did not err in rejecting Mr Howe's 
motion for partial summary judgment 
id. at ffif 26-27 (emphasis added). 
The next section for support cited by Plaintiffs, paragraphs forty-nine (49) to fifty-
four (54), is the supreme court's assessment of Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim, 
specifically, Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. These paragraphs address whether 
"Mr. Howe provided sufficient facts to demonstrate Sgt. Bryant lacked probable cause 
for the arrest." id- at ^ 48. Unlike Plaintiffs' reflection of the court's conclusion in their 
Opposition/Reply Memorandum in Response to Court's Directive, pages four(4) through 
six (6), the court actually stated: 
Our decision here, as it was in Part I, is largely conditioned on the 
burden imposed under the analysis. Unlike Part I, we must accept the 
facts as presented by Mr. Howe as true in this part of our analysis, 
[citation omitted]. Mr. Howe has claimed, and has presented supporting 
facts, that he subjectively believed a burglary occurred at the school, and 
relayed that information to police. Sgt. Bryant and Ms. Werner simply 
disregarded this construction of the facts known to them. When Mr. Howe 
attempted to contact Ms. Werner directly to explain the events of June 27, 
2003, she refused to respond, stating she did not need to listen to Mr. 
Howe's "rationalization and justification." We believe the facts alleged by 
Mr. Howe raise at least a jury question on the lack of probable cause and, 
therefore, make out a constitutional violation of Mr Howe's right to be free 
from unreasonable seizure sufficient to survive qualified immunity. 
id- at 54 (emphasis added). The court did not make any findings in regards to Werner 
and Plaintiffs' specific state law claim of malicious prosecution. 
As noted in footnote five (5) above, the supreme court concluded this particular 
9 
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section in finding that "Mr.. Howe has presented facts that tend to show Sgt Bryant 
violated his Fourth Amendment right free from unreasonable seizure[.]" ]dL at ^ 56 
(emphasis added). There is no finding made by the supreme court as to probable 
cause and Werner in relation to Plaintiffs' state law claim of malicious prosecution. 
Howe has the burden of proving the following four elements of the tort of 
malicious prosecution: (1) Werner and Bryant initiated or procured the initiation of 
criminal proceedings against an innocent plaintiff; (2) Werner and Bryant did not have 
probable cause to initiate the prosecution; (3) Werner and Bryant initiated the 
proceedings primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice; 
and (4) the proceedings terminated in favor of the accused. Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156 
(citations omitted). 
As to the second prong of the malicious prosecution test, Plaintiffs rely on 
deposition statements of Werner and Bryant, in that Bryant consulted with Werner to 
determine which ordinances were violated. (Exs.. to Pis' Mot. for Part. Summ." J,, Ex. 8 
(BryantDep. 89:12-93-23, July, 10, 2007). 
In response to counsel's question, Bryant stated that he and Werner determined 
that the "false alarm ordinance and ordinances, city ordinances that are sort of 
incorporated in the false alarm ordinance couldn't be used against Mr. Howe[.]" Id. at 
92:1-6. . 
10 
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Bryant then explains that he proceeded to conduct research on a computer 
system with access to the state code and all city ordinances and found a state code 
that he proceeded to cite against Howe. id. 92:9-93-23. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained in Hodges: 
An accusation leading to the initiation of a criminal prosecution 
must be based on probable cause determined as of the time the action 
was filed. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662 comment e (1977). 
n.37 The accuser must have sufficient information based on an adequate 
investigation to justify the conclusion that there is probable cause to 
initiate a criminal proceeding, [citations omitted]. The accuser must have 
a reasonable basis for believing the accusation and must also subjectively 
believe the accusation to be true. 
811 P.2d at 158 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
Because doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be 
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 
Note three provides: 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662 (1977) provides a three-part standard 
for determining whether a defendant has probable cause in initiating an action for 
malicious prosecution: 
One who initiates or continues criminal proceedings against another has probable 
cause for doing so if he correctly or reasonably believes 
(a) that the person whom he accuses has acted or failed to act in a particular 
manner, and 
(b) that those acts or omissions constitute the offense that he charges against the 
accused, and 
(c) that he is sufficiently informed as to the law and the facts to justify him in 
initiating or continuing the prosecution. 
id. at n.3. (emphasis added). 
11 
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1984) (citations omitted), i,e. Plaintiffs in regards to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs' state law claim of malicious prosecution remains a viable cause of 
action for consideration in trail against Werner srfi Bryant. 
4. Defamation 
This remains a viable cause of action for consideration in trial against Werner in 
her individual capacity. 
5. Conspiracy 
This remains a viable cause of action for consideration in trial against Werner 
and Bryant. 
This Ruling stands as the ORDER of the Court. No further Order is required. 
ANNOUNCED and DATED this 7th day of December, 2011. V 
BY THE COURT: 
LADEVER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
12 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 7,h day of December, I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the above Ruling to the following: 
J. Wesley Robinson 
Salt Lake City and County Building, Room 505 
451 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stephen C. Clark 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
wam Twer7 CLERK OF COURT 
V... 
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